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NOT SO LANDMARK AFTER ALL?
LAWRENCE V. TEXAS: CLASSICAL LIBERALISM AND
DUE PROCESS JURISPRUDENCE

Davin J. Hall'

This Note sheds new light on Lawrence v. Texas.' Insteadof commenting on the
political implications of Lawrence, this Note examines how the Supreme Court
returned to an olderform of substantive due process analysis without explicitly
stating so. Although some of the Lawrence scholarshiphasponderedhow Lawrence
changed the type of history the Supreme Court should examine when finding
fundamental rights,2 ultimately Lawrence really turnedon a conception of classical
liberaljustice vis-a-vis an applicationof history. This Note concludes by arguing
that whereas a postmodern philosophical approach best explains Lawrence, the
Supreme Court ought to apply tenets of classical liberalism in its due process

jurisprudence.

INTRODUCTION

Originating in Lockean and Jeffersonian political theory,3 the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments are hallmarks of American liberal
democracy.4 Safeguarding citizens from state abuse, courts have interpreted the
* The author would like to thank Lou Baltman, Brendan Chandonnet, and the William
& Mary Bill of Rights Journalstaff. All errors and omissions are the author's.
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
2 See infra note 141 and accompanying text.
3 Compare U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be... deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law. . . ."), and U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ("No State
shall.., deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .. "),
with THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (A legitimate government
ensures "[1]ife, [1]iberty, and the pursuit of [hiappiness."), and JOHN LOCKE, SECOND
TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 123 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Hackett Publishing Co. 1980)
(1690) (Civil Society's ends are "the mutual preservation of [citizens'] lives, liberties and
estates.").
4 This Note uses the term "liberal" consistently with the doctrine of philosophical
classical liberalism, which is a theory that advocates individual liberty, natural rights, and
limited government. See Steven J. Heyman, Spheres of Autonomy: Reforming the Content
Neutrality Doctrinein FirstAmendment Jurisprudence,10 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 647,
657 (2002) ("[A] central tenet of liberalism is that a boundary must be drawn between the
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clauses as both protecting rights unenumerated in the text of the Federal Constitution5
and granting procedural guarantees that ensure that when the arms of government
seek to deprive citizens of life, liberty, or property, they do so in a manner consistent
with the Constitution. 6 The former idea is commonly known as substantive due
process whereas the latter is known as procedural due process.7 In particular,
substantive due process has a mixed history in the eyes of the American public, the
state and federal judiciary, and various elected officials. 8 Supreme Court decisions
that turn on an application of substantive due process are often a piece of a larger
domestic debate. Since the Civil Rights era, many substantive due process cases
have involved social issues that have sparked heated public discourse as well as a
vast array of academic literature. 9
Lawrence v. Texas,' ° which held that a Texas anti-sodomy statute violated the
Fourteenth Amendment," will follow this trend. If the reaction to Lawrence follows
the history of reaction to controversial Supreme Court opinions, scholars, journalists,
and policymakers will intensely comment on the decision. It is quite possible that
individuals across the nation will celebrate Lawrence, claiming it as one of the
milestones for complete societal acceptance of the rights of homosexuals and the
end of needless government regulation of morals.' 2 Furthermore, Lawrence is
interesting from a theoretical standpoint, to wit: academics can understand Lawrence
as an example of where the politics of tolerance superceded a given community's
interest in virtue.' 3 In this sense, Lawrence is germane to National Socialist Party
outward realm of the state and inward life of the individual."). When reading this Note, the
reader must not confuse the term "liberal" with how some use the term today - that is,
advocating progressive or left of center public policy.
' See generally JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW §§
11.1-11.4 (5th ed. 1995) (defining substantive due process over the last two hundred years).
6 Id. at § 13.1 ("The due process clauses also have a procedural aspect in that they
guarantee that each person shall be accorded a certain 'process' if they are deprived of life,
liberty, or property.").
7 Id.

' See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977) ("Substantive due
process has at times been a treacherous field for this Court. There are risks when the judicial
branch gives enhanced protection to certain substantive liberties without the guidance of the
more specific provisions of the Bill of Rights."). See also infra note 60.
9 See James G. Wilson, The Role of Public Opinion in ConstitutionalInterpretation,
1993 BYU L. REv. 1037.
10539 U.S. 558 (2003).
"1 Id. at 558.
2 See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The "FundamentalRight" ThatDare
NotSpeakIts Name, 117 HARv. L.REv. 1893, 1938 n. 174 (2004) ("One can expect libertarians
and other champions of liberal individualism to claim Lawrence as a victory for their camp
and to trumpet it as a first salvo in a new war on government regulation generally ....).
13 Generally, classical liberalism favors tolerance over community values in order to
avoid zealous partisans from fighting with one another, thus ensuring civil peace. See
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ofAmerica v. Village of Skokie.' 4 As much as these questions and issues concerning
the political implications of Lawrence can and should provoke thoughts, this Note
does not add to those inquiries.
Instead, this Note focuses on equally interesting questions of how Lawrence fits
within the fundamental rights scheme from the viewpoint of structural analysis, and
how lawyers will benefit from understanding Lawrence from the viewpoint of
classical liberal political thought. As a beginning point, Lawrence does not follow
the recent trend of fundamental rights cases.' 5 To be sure, Lawrence has value as
a political precedent that, when taken in conjunction with recent events, will
hopefully lead to broader politics of inclusion. 6 However, Lawrence will have little
7
effect on how the Rehnquist Court approaches fundamental rights in the future.'
Whereas Lawrence appeared to be one of the most important cases of the 2003
Supreme Court term, ultimately it is not as landmark as one might perceive from a
structural viewpoint, for Lawrence is akin to older Supreme Court opinions that
invoked classical liberal ideals.
Part I introduces the reader to the familiar framework under which the Supreme
Court has reviewed past fundamental rights cases. This framework presupposes that
Justices may either impose a conception of justice or utilize an interpretation of
history when determining whether to apply heightened review. 8 Part II then
examines the structure of Lawrence itself to see how it fits within fundamental rights
jurisprudence. Some argue that Lawrence changes the scope of evidence from

generally STEVEN KAUTZ, LIBERALISM AND COMMUNrrY 75 (1995) ("[Peace and security,
which is the fundamental condition of any civil politics, is permanently threatened by the
naturally immoderate passions of human beings.").
14 432 U.S. 43 (1977) (per curiam). In Skokie, the Court reversed the Illinois Supreme
Court's denial of a stay that would have allowed the Nazis to march in Skokie, Illinois. The
Court insisted that a denial of a group's First Amendment right of free speech is unconstitutional without the requisite procedural safeguards of appellate review. Id.at 43-44. Interpreted
broadly, Skokie illustrates the Court's unwillingness to arbitrarily deny the rights of
individuals who are unpopular, even if they offend a community's sense of equality or virtue.
'5 See infra Parts I.B.2, II.C-E.
16 See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 629-32 (1996) (stating that the Equal
Protection Clause prevents a state from passing legislation that has the effect of outlawing
any government-backed anti-discrimination efforts). See generally Hernandez v. Robles, No.
103434/2004 (N.Y. Gen. Term Feb. 4, 2005) (invalidating New York's same-sex law);
Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 2004) (directing the
Massachusetts legislature to enact law that gives homosexual couples the right to marry);
Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) (holding that Vermont's Common Benefits Clause
gives homosexual couples the right to form civil unions).
" See infra notes 176-89 and accompanying text.
18 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (investigating history and
tradition, rather than natural justice or a conception of justice, as a basis for fundamental
right to assisted suicide).
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which the Court will find fundamental rights, 9 but in the end, the majority's
invocation of classical liberal ideals, rather than a new evidentiary scope, controlled
the opinion in Lawrence. The Court used "implicit in ordered liberty" analysis
without explicitly stating so.20
Assuming that is true, Part Ill then asks (a) whether the Court is going to
return to ordered liberty analysis or an equivalent thereof, and (b) if it has or will,
does it make a difference in the broader scheme of substantive due process
jurisprudence? Part H1 answers both of these questions in the negative on the
grounds of empiricism and a postmodern philosophical approach. Lawrence is not
so landmark after all. Whereas the choice to employ natural justice analysis over
history and tradition analysis may not make a difference in terms of results,
Lawrence illustrates that a natural justice analysis is paramount in fundamental
rights jurisprudence.
I. BACKGROUND:

FRAMING SUBSTANTIVE

DUE PROCESS JURISPRUDENCE

In order to understand how Lawrence fits within the fundamental rights scheme,
one must first understand what is meant by a "fundamental right." This section
introduces the reader to the relevant issues that frame an analysis of Lawrence.
With that in mind, a preliminary description of what constitutes a fundamental right
is it is the most significant liberty interest and is deserving of the highest judicial
scrutiny:
[W]here fundamental personal liberties are involved, they may
not be abridged by the States simply on a showing that a regulatory statute has some rational relationship to the effectuation of
a proper state purpose. "Where there is a significant encroachment upon personal liberty, the State may prevail only upon
showing a subordinating interest which is compelling."'"
If a particular liberty interest is a fundamental right, then "legislative enactments
must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate [and compelling] state
interests at stake. '2 2 Theoretically, this standard is more exacting than the newest
standard articulated for abortion rights2 or other significant liberty interests.24
1' See infra note 140 and accompanying text.

See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562-79 (2003) (lacking any references to the phrase
"implicit in ordered liberty" in the majority opinion).
21 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,497 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting
20

Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960)).
22 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
23

In stressing that Pennsylvania had a "[substantial] interest in potential life," while

simultaneously recognizing a woman's right to have an abortion, Justice O'Connor announced
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Fundamental rights include those that are enumerated 25 or unenumerated in the
Constitution. 26 Moreover, the methods by which Justices find fundamental rights
worthy of heightened review are varied and, at times, in theoretical opposition.
A. Method One: Justice as Foundationfor UnenumeratedRights
7
stated, the Supreme Court has utilized two
As the Court in Bowers v. Hardwicl2
right exists:
a
fundamental
whether
to
determine
methods

[TIhe Court has sought to identify the nature of the rights qualifying for heightened judicial protection. In Palko v. Connecticut,
it was said that this category includes those fundamental liberties that are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," such that
"neither liberty nor justice would exist if [they] were sacrificed."
A different description of fundamental liberties appeared in
Moore v. East Cleveland, where they are characterized as those
liberties that are "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition."2
Essentially, the former category is an appeal to a claim of justice whereas the latter
is an appeal to righteousness of community. Although not discussing substantive
due process, Calder v. Bull 29 characterized how the former category of natural
justice could overrule an unjust legislative act:
her "undue burden" standard and concluded that "[a] statute which.... while furthering the
interest in potential life or some other valid state interest, has the effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman's choice cannot be considered a permissible means of
serving its legitimate ends." Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992).
24 See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,279 (1990) (holding that
the right to terminate life support is a protected liberty under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment after balancing that right against state interests to determine whether
a state law passed constitutional muster).
25 For example, the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures is an enumerated fundamental right.
26 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 848 ("Neither the Bill of Rights nor the specific practices of
States at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment marks the outer limits of the
substantive sphere of liberty .... ").
27 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558.
28 Id. at 191-92 (citations omitted). Another theory, found in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S.
497,516 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting), and Griswoldv. Connecticut,381 U.S. 479, 492-95
(1965), is that the basis for fundamental liberties is found within enumerations of liberties
within the Bill of Rights. But see Tribe, supra note 12, at 1922 ("[T]he Court's application
of the Due Process Clause to give substantive protection to liberty is not and has never in
truth been a naming game, and it would take more than language... to demote it to one.").
29 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
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The people of the United States erected their Constitutions, or
forms of government, to establish justice, to promote the general
welfare, to secure the blessings of liberty; and to protect their
persons and property from violence. The purposes for which men
enter into society will determine the nature and terms of the social
compact; and as they are the foundation of the legislative power,
they will decide what are the proper objects of it: The nature, and
ends of legislative power will limit the exercise of it.... There
are certainvital principlesin ourfree Republican governments,
which will determine and over-rule an apparent and flagrant
abuse of legislative power .... An ACT of the Legislature...
contrary to the great first principles of the social compact, cannot
be considered a rightful exercise of legislative authority.3"
The raison d'etre of this statement - that natural justice is the root of fundamental
rights and principles - is the basis for many Justices' opinions during the history
of Fourteenth Amendment due process jurisprudence.3
1. Natural Justice Finds the Fourteenth Amendment
When promoting an economic substantive due process right reminiscent of
Adam Smith's economic philosophy, 32 Justice Peckham wrote in Lochner v. New
York33 that an individual possesses "the general right.., to be free in his person and
in his power to contract in relation to his own labor." 4 Although Peckham did not
write explicitly that natural justice dictated such a conclusion, the opinion lends
itself to the conclusion that his conception of justice, rather than American history
or tradition, was his basis for finding that a sixty-hour work week labor law
violated the Fourteenth Amendment. 35 Here, the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed
economic rights.
Id. at 388 (emphases added and omitted).
"' See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
30

32

See ADAM SMrrH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF

NATIONS

(Kathryn Sutherland ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1993) (1776).

31 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
34 Id. at 58.
35 When asking if such a law was "within the police power of the state," Justice Peckham

concluded that "[t]here is no reasonable ground for interfering with the liberty of person or
the right of free contract." Id. at 57; cf.Mulger v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887) ("If... a
statute purporting to have been enacted to protect ...
public morals ...
is a palpable invasion
of rights secured by the fundamental law, it is the duty of the courts to so adjudge....").
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The Supreme Court has used due process to evaluate non-economic fundamental
rights as well. For example, in Palko v. Connecticut,36 an appellant-convict argued
that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Fifth Amendment's doublej eopardy
prohibition, which made it applicable to the states.37 The Court, per Justice Cardozo,
interpreted the appellant's argument as stating that the Fourteenth Amendment
incorporated all of the Bill of Rights." In finding for the government, Cardozo
stated that the appropriate test for determining whether the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment invalidates acts of state legislatures is whether the liber39
ties they infringe are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Furthermore, the
dissenting opinions in Poe v. Ullman' explained that lawyers should view the
concept of ordered liberty from the standpoint of natural justice. In arguing that a
Connecticut ban on contraceptives was unconstitutional, Justice Douglas wrote that
one purpose of the Due Process Clause is to grant unenumerated rights; for "to say
that a legislature may do anything not within a specific guarantee of the Constitution
may be as crippling to a free society as to allow it to override specific guarantees."'"
Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe is even more on point to this section's discussion.
He stated that the only proper understanding of the Due Process Clause was to see
it as a tool grounded in natural rights philosophy. He opined, "the reach of Fourteenth
Amendment due process... [applies] those concepts which are considered to embrace
those rights 'which are... fundamental; which belong.., to the citizens of all free
governments' 42... for 'the purposes [of securing] which men enter into society.""'
The objective of substantive due process, according to Harlan, is to help citizens
enforce their rights under the classical liberal social contract. Based on this interpretation of the Due Process Clause, it is unconstitutional for a government to act in
any way contrary to natural rights or natural justice. This is different than claiming
4
fundamental rights are based in various enumerations of liberty in the Constitution.
36

302 U.S. 319 (1937).

31 Id. at 322.
31 Id. at 323.

Id. at 325. Justice Cardozo explained further that a violation of fundamental rights
would be a "violat[ion] [of] those 'fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at
the base of all our civil and political institutions."' Id. at 328 (quoting Hebert v. Louisiana,
272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926)).
4 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
4iId. at 518 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
41 id. at 541 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F.Cas. 546, 551
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1825) (No. 3,230)).
41 Id. (quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798)).
4
In Justice Douglas's dissent in Poe, he stated that fundamental fights derive either from
"emanations of other specific guarantees or from experience with the requirements of a free
society." Id. at 517 (citations omitted). The majority's opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965), expanded the former idea, whereas the latter idea is the natural justice
concept that this section describes. In Griswold, the majority found that a contraceptive ban
infringed upon the fundamental privacy rights of married couples because the Ninth
31
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Juxtaposed to the natural justice formulation of fundamental rights is a concept of
due process rights that has its basis in the community.
B. Method Two: Community as Foundationfor UnenumeratedRights
The second major foundation for fundamental rights is an appeal to community.
The Supreme Court ratifies the community approach when it appeals to deeply
rooted history and tradition.4 5 Here, the given values of a particular democratic
community are the underpinnings for fundamental rights more so than are beliefs
about naturaljustice. Instead of asking whether a violation of a given right is unconstitutional because the right is "implicit in ordered liberty," 6 the community approach
argues that a state is free to act "unless in doing so it offends some principle ofjustice
so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental."47 The implicit in ordered liberty test is thus more akin to classical liberal
thought vis-4-vis the history and tradition test, which is a postmodem approach to
rights. 8 Forthcoming sections of this Note will elaborate on the relevance of this
debate. 49 For now, it is necessary for the reader to understand how the Supreme
Court has employed community as a foundation for substantive due process rights."
1. Appeals to Community Generally
In Twining v. New Jersey,"'the defendants appealed their convictions on, inter
alia, due process grounds.5 2 They argued that the Fourteenth Amendment incorpoAmendment gives citizens more rights than are just found within the text of the Constitution.
Id. at 492-95. The Ninth Amendment was the majority's tool to apply a fundamental right
of privacy. "Various guarantees [in the Bill of Rights] create zones of privacy." Id. at 484.
One could argue that this is an indirect application of natural rights because the Preamble,
articles, and amendments of the Constitution have their grounding in classical liberalism;
Justice Harlan, however, would disagree as to the desirability of a penumbra theory. See Poe,
367 U.S. at 541 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[lit is not the particular enumeration of rights in the
first eight Amendments which spell out the reach of Fourteenth Amendment due process, but
rather... [natural justice].").
4 See infra note 48.
See supra note 39.
Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
48

CompareTHOMAS HOBBES, LEvIATHAN (Edwin M. Curley ed., Hackett Publishing Co.

1994) (1688) (basing the desirability of the social contract on the laws of Nature), with
RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY,

AND

SOLIDARITY (1989) (stressing the adherence

of liberal values because they are our values rather than the fact that Nature or Reason
dictates their existence).
49 See infra Parts III.B-C.

s See infra Part I.B. 1.
s'211 U.S. 78 (1908).
Ild. at 91.
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rated the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination as against the
states.53 Taking an originalist approach, the Court asked the controlling question:
"Did those who then were formulating and insisting upon the rights of the people
entertain the view that the right was so fundamental that there could be no due
process without it?"' In short, did the larger community of states view the privilege
against self-incrimination as a fundamental right at the time of the founding of the
United States? The Court investigated the legislative history on the issue and
concluded that the answer was no.55 Twining thus stands for the proposition that if
the majority of states protected a particular liberty by state law at the time of the
founding, then that particular liberty is a fundamental right subject to the scrutiny
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 6
2. More Recent Appeals to Community: from Moore to Glucksberg
In 1977, the Court in Moore v. City of East Cleveland" examined the constitutionality of a housing ordinance that made it illegal for a grandmother to
house more than one grandchild. 8 Understanding that a grant of fundamental rights
can cause political backlash,5 9 the Court in Moore nonetheless found that the statute
activated due process analysis "because the institution of the family is deeply rooted
in this Nation's history and tradition."'6 The Court reasoned further that the statute
"marginally" served the City's ends of traffic safety and, therefore, the statute was
not narrowly tailored.6

51 Id. at 99.
5 Id. at 108.
" Id. at 110-11 ("[Flour only of the thirteen original states insisted upon incorporating
the privilege in the Constitution... [t]his survey does not tend to show that this was then in
this country the universal or even general belief that the privilege ranked among the
fundamental and inalienable rights of mankind .... ").
56 Other cases, however, have noted that sometimes the relevant inquiry is whether a
state protected a liberty interest at the time of the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848 (1992) ("Neither the Bill
of Rights nor the specific practices of States at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment marks the outer limits of the substantive sphere of liberty . .
17 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
" Id. at 494.
'9 Although stating that Lochner's overruling of a popular labor reform caused many to
see substantive due process as a tool for elite economic conservatism, the Court in Moore
nonetheless wrote that the Lochner "history counsels caution and restraint [of the finding of
fundamental rights]. But it does not counsel abandonment.. . ." Id. at 502.
60 Id. at 503 (citation omitted).
6 Id. at 499-500.
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With this analysis in mind, Bowers v. Hardwick62 seemed to ring the death knell
for natural justice analysis with its affirmation of Moore.63 In reciting the two most
relevant tests for fundamental rights" when deciding that an anti-sodomy statute did
not violate substantive due process, Justice White explained that because "[piroscriptions against [sodomy] have ancient roots,"' the respondent had no Fourteenth
Amendment claim.66 Acknowledging the State's legitimate interest, and therefore
rational basis, in community virtue, 67 White refused to apply a natural justice
analysis, presumably out of fear of returning to the Lochner era: "Nor are we
inclined to take a more expansive view of our authority to discover new fundamental
rights imbedded in the Due Process Clause. The Court is most vulnerable and comes
nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law .... ""
Bowers thus signaled to the legal community that natural justice had no place in
fundamental rights jurisprudence. The last case in this subsection, Washington v.
Glucksberg,69 confirms the fact that Court has strayed from natural justice analysis
in the years following Bowers.
Glucksberg decided whether due process requires that states respect a
fundamental right to assisted suicide. 0 From the outset of the opinion, the reader
can infer Chief Justice Rehnquist's structural analysis from his observation that, "[i]t
has always been a crime to assist a suicide in the State of Washington."'" If there
was any doubt as to whether the Court would employ natural justice, Chief Justice
Rehnquist dispelled such a thought. He wrote, "[w]e begin, as we do in all due
process cases, by examining our Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices."72
In applying the communitarian standard for fundamental rights, Rehnquist concluded there was no fundamental right to assisted suicide because the State of
Washington's legal history, Western democracy's legal history, the common law,
and American legal history did not support that right.7 3 Even though some states,
the federal government, and other Western countries were debating the plausibility
of lifting assisted suicide bans, these facts were not enough evidence to conclude
478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
63 Id. at 192.
' See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
6' Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192. For a more full description of the reasoning in Bowers, see
infra notes 91-97 and accompanying text.
6 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194.
67 Id. at 196.
68 Id. at 194.
69 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
70 Id. at 705.
71 Id. at 706.
72 Id. at 710 (emphasis added). Of course, this ignored the Court's own precedent. See
supranotes 28-51 (recalling the dual methods for finding fundamental rights pursuant to the
Due Process Clause).
71 521 U.S. at 710-17.
62
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that assisted suicide was a deeply rooted fundamental right sufficient to invoke an
analysis of whether a narrowly tailored compelling state interest would allow an
infringement of the right.74 Assuming the foregoing is true, that in 1997 the Court
deemed the investigation of deeply rooted history and tradition the only relevant
inquiry as to whether a given liberty was a fundamental right for the purposes of the
Fourteenth Amendment, then Glucksberg should have controlled the analysis in
75
Lawrence. Although the Supreme Court adheres regularly to stare decisis, the
following section argues that, in fact, Glucksberg did not control Lawrence. The
Court instead returned to an older substantive due process decision-making model.
II. ANALYZING LAWRENCE: JUSTICE OR COMMUNITY AS FOUNDATION FOR
PRIVACY RIGHTS?

Refusing to be bound by stare decisis, the Court in Lawrence overruled Bowers
76
and extended the right of privacy to adult consensual homosexual sexual activity.
The Court aimed to dispute the understanding of history in Bowers in order to
discredit Justice White's reasoning." With that in mind, the Court invoked both (a)
recent changes in the state law and (b) European case law as its communitarian
foundation for protecting the autonomy of practicing homosexuals. These invocations, however, were a mere fagade for what really drove the majority opinion.
Whereas the Court also implied that equal protection analysis was "tenable,"
ultimately the Court's decision turned on neither equal protection nor the abovementioned community foundation for rights, but on sentiments reminiscent of
implicit in ordered liberty analysis and classical liberal political truth." To be sure,
79
the Court in Lawrence did not explicitly grant a new "fundamental right,"
however, the Court's philosophical opinion leads to no other conclusion.
74 id. at 717-19, 725. The Court did, however, consider that the State's interest was

legitimate to pass a rational basis analysis. Id. at 728-30.

71See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) (refusing to overrule
the infamous Miranda rule because the "principles of stare decisis weigh heavily against
overruling it now").
76 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003).
77See infra Part II.B (arguing that this attempt to discredit the Court's reasoning in

Bowers failed and as such the Court in Lawrence must have changed the fundamental rights
decision-making model).

See infra Part II.E.
71"Though there is discussion of 'fundamental proposition[s],' ... nowhere does the
Court's opinion declare that homosexual sodomy is a 'fundamental right' under the Due
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal citations
Process Clause ......
omitted). Although Scalia's observation is correct, this Note shows that the Lawrence
decision must be understood as a fundamental rights case. See generally Lofton v. Sec'y of
Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 377 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2004) (Barkett, J., dissenting)
(arguing that Lawrence reaffirmed a fundamental right to privacy based in part on recent
78

history and tradition).
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A. Necessary Facts
The relevant facts are as follows. Two police officers came to Lawrence's home
for an alleged weapons violation. 80 There was no issue over whether their entry into
Lawrence's apartment triggered Fourth Amendment analysis. 81 "The officers
observed Lawrence and another man, Tyson Garner, engaging in a sexual act. 8 2
Unlike the facts in Bowers, these men were arrested and convicted of violating a
sodomy statute.83 Also, unlike the statute in Bowers, the Texas statute in Lawrence
applied only to same-sex conduct: "A person commits an offense if he engages in
deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of the same sex ... [and a]n
offense under this section is a Class C misdemeanor." '
The statute defines
"[d]eviate sexual intercourse" as same-sex fellatio or any genital/anal intercourse."
Lawrence and Garner were convicted and all attempts to appeal their
convictions within the State of Texas failed.86 The Texas Court of Appeals, for
example, cited the holding and reasoning in Bowers as one of the factors in
affirming Lawrence and Garner's convictions.'
When the petitioners appeared
before the United States Supreme Court, the questions they presented were (a)
whether the Texas statute (Statute) violated the Equal Protection Clause, (b) whether
the Statute violated due process, and (c) whether Bowers v. Hardwick should be
overruled.88 The Lawrence decision focused on questions (b) and (c), ultimately
overruling Bowers.89
80

Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562.

81 Id. at 563.

Id.
Id. In Bowers the respondent was arrested, but the charges were dropped at a
preliminary hearing. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 187-88. The respondent had standing to bring
his case to the Supreme Court based on the fact that he was in "imminent danger of arrest."
Id. at 188.
4 TEx. PENALCODE ANN. § 21.06(a)-(b) (Vernon 2003). The applicable Georgia statute
when Bowers was arrested applied both to heterosexual and homosexual couples. See GA.
CODE ANN. § 16-6-2(a)-(b) (1984), overruled by Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18, 26 (Ga.
1998).
85 See TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.01 (1) (Vernon 2003).
86 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 563.
87 id. ("The majority opinion indicates that the Court of Appeals considered our decision
in Bowers v. Hardwick to be controlling. .. .") (citation omitted); Lawrence v. State, 41
S.W.3d 349, 361 (2001) ("In fact, there was such unanimity of condemnation that sodomy
was, before 1961, a criminal offense in all fifty states and the District of Columbia.... In
Texas, homosexual conduct has been a criminal offense for well over a century.") (citing
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 193).
'8Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564.
89 Id. at 578 ("Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today. It
ought not to remain binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwickshould be and now is overruled.").
82

83
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B. ReasonableMinds Differ? The Lawrence CourtFails to Undercut Bowers

In Bowers, Justice White began his analysis by stating that the question
requiring resolution was "whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental
right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy." 9 As previously mentioned, the
Court in Bowers meant only to examine American history and tradition in
determining whether there was a "fundamental right.., to engage in sodomy."'"
The Court then attempted to explain why it thought that "[p]roscriptions against that
conduct have ancient roots."92 The Court made statements about how sodomy was
an act that many states prohibited since the colonial era.9 3 The Court added that all
of the states outlawed sodomy at the time of the implementation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and that sodomy was outlawed by about half of the states in 1986.'"
Thus, the Court purported to give enough historical information for those who think
that (a) history and tradition should be seen through a colonial-originalistantebellum lens, (b) a Fourteenth Amendment time-of-enactment lens, or (c) a more
current-events lens. 95

In summary, the following analytical framework is a helpful way to understand
the logic of Bowers:
(a) If something is a fundamental right, then it is supported by
deeply rooted American history and tradition.
(b) Therefore, if something is not supported by deeply rooted
American history and tradition, it is not a fundamental right.
(c) All homosexual sexual activities are acts of sodomy.
(d) Sodomy is not supported by history and tradition.
(e) Therefore, sodomy is not a fundamental right.
(f) Therefore, all homosexual sexual activities are not fundamental rights.'

Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190. The Court in Lawrence argued that framing the issue in that
manner signaled what was to be a denial of Bowers's rights. Commenting on the issue
framing in Bowers, Justice Kennedy wrote "[t]hat statement [in Bowers], we now conclude,
discloses the Court's own failure to appreciate the extent of the liberty at stake." Lawrence,
539 U.S. at 567.
91 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190; see also supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text.
90

92 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192.
93 Id.
94 Id. at

193.

See id at 192-93.
96 See id. at 191-96.
15
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Presuming this model is correct, a court that would want to undercut Bowers would
have two options: (1) to attack the premises and conclusions within the model,
which means that deeply rooted American history and tradition did in fact support
the right to engage in sodomy, or (2) to change the analytical framework itself. The
following subsections argue that because the Court in Lawrence failed to deconstruct the model, then the Court must have chosen to shift the analytical
framework. This leads one to conclude that the new framework is either a slight
alteration of the Bowers-Glucksberg history and tradition test9 7 or a new test based
on natural justice.98

In essence, the Court in Lawrence did not posit that American history
"suggest[ed] approval of homosexual conduct" but that certain historical "considerations counsel against adopting the definitive conclusions upon which Bowers
placed such reliance."' ° The gist of the Court's reasoning here is that (a) the state
did not apply sodomy laws to consensual private activity between adults and (b) the
state did not mean to enforce sodomy laws only against homosexuals.
To begin, the Court wrote that "[liaws prohibiting sodomy do not seem to have
been enforced against consenting adults acting in private."'0 ' The Court noted that
sodomy laws were meant to protect children and rape victims.'" The Court asserted
that actual prosecutions were only of "relations between men and minor girls or
minor boys.., relations between adults implicating disparity in status, or relations
between men and animals."' 3 It seems, therefore, that history supported the "right
to be let alone."'"
Moreover, "[t]he absence of legal prohibitions focusing on homosexual
conduct may be explained in part by noting that according to some scholars the
concept of the homosexual ... did not emerge until the late 19th century."'' 0 5 If
there was no real homosexual identity, then there would be no law to affect him/her.
As the Court implied, one cannot assert that proscriptions against homosexual
intimacy have ancient roots if there was no identity of persons for whom to
proscribe that conduct. "
This examination raises the issue of whether the Court in Lawrence negated the
logic of Bowers. Resolution of this issue depends on how the reader interprets the
97 See infra Part II.D.
98

See infra Part II.E.

99 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 568-69.
Id. at 568.
101 id. at 569.
'o

102

103

Id.
Id.

0 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(describing the fundamental importance of the "right to be let alone").
105 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 568.
0 See id. at 568-69.
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preceding discussion. One interpretation of Lawrence could be that there is a
deeply rooted American history and tradition of letting private consensual adult
sexual conduct occur without state interference.' 1 7 Accordingly, there may be a
foundation for a fundamental right; this discussion would extend what the Court
means by a right of privacy to all consensual adult sexual conduct. On the other
hand, the correct interpretation of the foregoing discussion is that it failed to
undercut the reasoning in Bowers.
As mentioned previously, in order for the Bowers-Glucksberg method of
fundamental rights analysis to protect consensual homosexual sexual activity, it
must be supported by deeply rooted American history and tradition.1 8 Commenting
on the proposition that sodomy laws were not enforced specifically against
practicing homosexuals in private, Justice Scalia in his Lawrence dissent countered,
"[t]his observation in no way casts into doubt the 'definitive [historical] conclusio[n]' on which Bowers relied: that our Nation has a longstanding history of
laws prohibiting sodomy in general - regardless of whether it was performed by
same-sex or opposite-sex couples.""' As a matter of logic, it follows that if all
sodomy is prohibited, then private homosexual sodomy is prohibited also regardless
of non-enforcement. This leads to the inevitable conclusion that an appeal to
community, such as an invocation of long-standing majoritarian tradition, supports
neither the idea of a fundamental right of sodomy nor private, homosexual,
consensual adult sexual conduct. As the preceding section pointed out, the Court
in Lawrence had two options: (1) to work within the Bowers-Glucksbergframework
to overturn Bowers or (2) to change the analytical framework itself.'
Thus, the
only way to counter Scalia's criticism is to conclude that the Court in Lawrence
must have changed the analytical framework.
C. Why Not Equal Protection?
Before describing what that new framework is, it is necessary to take a brief
aside into why the Court in Lawrence needed to change the analytical framework that is, why the Court did not adopt Justice O'Connor's equal protection opinion.
In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor focused on the fact that the Statute
criminalized same-sex sodomy whereas it did not criminalize heterosexual
"07 This interpretation is comparable to part of Justice Stevens's dissent in Bowers.
"Guided by history, our tradition of respect for the dignity of individual choice in matters of
conscience and the restraints implicit in the federal system, federal judges have accepted the
responsibility for recognition and protection of these rights in appropriate cases." Bowers,
478 U.S. at 217 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Fitzgerald v. Porter Mem'l Hosp., 532 F.2d
716, 719-20 (7th Cir. 1975)).
o See supra notes 73, 92 and accompanying text.
'o Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 596 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
110 See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
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sodomy. "' The State of Texas argued that because homosexuals were not a suspect
class, and because the State had a legitimate interest in the protection of morals, the
Statute passed rational basis review." 2 However, O'Connor distinguished Bowers,
in which the sodomy statute outlawed all sodomy," 3 from the facts in Lawrence,
where Texas only outlawed homosexual sodomy:
This case raises a different issue than Bowers: whether,
under the Equal Protection Clause, moral disapproval is a
legitimate state interest to justify by itself a statute that bans
homosexual sodomy. It is not. Moral disapproval of this group,
like a bare desire to harm the group, is an interest that is
insufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the Equal
14
Protection Clause.'
O'Connor suggested that Bowers's challenge in 1986 failed because (a) history and
tradition did not support his due process claim and (b) the sodomy law was equally
applied to all individuals."' In Lawrence, however, the State purposefully attacked
a group that offended the community's sense of virtue. Justice O'Connor thus
joined the majority's result in Lawrence not because she thought the Statute
infringed on a fundamental and natural right, but because she disapproved of how
6
the Statute was a tool of majoritarian tyranny."
If the Statute was a tool of majoritarian tyranny, then why did the majority in
Lawrence not adopt O'Connor's concurrence? After all, the Court implied that
O'Connor's analysis was "a tenable argument.""' 7 The reason the Court did not
employ O'Connor's analysis was because it needed "to address whether Bowers

"

12

Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 581 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 582.

See also supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 582 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citation omitted). In this
respect, O'Connor's analysis follows the type of equal protection analysis described in
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985), and Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620
(1996). In Cleburne, the Court held that by forcing a mental health group home to apply for
a special use zoning permit for no apparent rational reason illustrated a community's
discriminatory purpose and, therefore, the Court deemed the requirement to be in violation
of the Equal Protection Clause. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 435, 447-51. In Romer, the Court
invalidated a Colorado law stating that homosexuals could never be afforded any protection
from discrimination because the law was arbitrarily discriminatory in nature and the
government did not have a legitimate interest in being discriminatory for its own sake.
Romer, 517 U.S. at 633-36.
"' See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 582-83 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
116 See id. at 583 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
117Id. at 574.
"id.
'"
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itself has continuing validity [under the Federal Constitution] ......
The Court had

to announce an opinion that all sodomy statutes offended an individual's right to
privacy. Assuming that (1) history and tradition do not support a right to private
consensual adult homosexual sexual activity but that (2) a state cannot legitimately target an unpopular group, then it is possible, according to O'Connor, for
states to continue to have sodomy statutes that apply equally to both same-sex and
opposite-sex couples." 9 This is why the Court must have had to announce a new
standard - it needed to find a way to ensure that such statutes would be invalid
because they violated substantive due process. In summary, Lawrence altered due
process precedent because (1) equal protection analysis would fail to achieve the
Court's ultimate goal, and (2) as previously mentioned, the Court did not undercut
the understanding of history in Bowers.
D. UnderstandingLawrence: Relativistic Communitarianismor Classical
LiberalRedux?

Lawrence was not in sync with the due process precedent of the last two
decades. Evidence in Lawrence supports two possible explanations of Lawrence's

contribution to fundamental rights jurisprudence: that either (a) Lawrence appealed
to community as a foundation for finding a right, or (b) communitarian appeals in
Lawrence are irrelevant because of the Court's classical liberal view of natural
justice.121 If the former is true, then Lawrence primarily appealed to community and
invoked majoritarian history. Under view (a), a liberty interest can be a fundamental
right only if the community deems it so. Some evidence in the case points to
understanding Lawrence as shifting the standard of Bowers-Glucksberg from deeply
rooted history and tradition to a more generational understanding of history, i.e., that

"' Id. at 575. The Court seemed to ignore O'Connor's argument that if a sodomy law was
applied to opposite-sex and same-sex couples alike, "such a law would not long stand in our
democratic society." Id. at 584-85 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Nor would it follow Justice
Thomas's call for judicial restraint such that even though this was an "uncommonly silly
[statute]," id. at 605 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at
527) (Stewart, J., dissenting)), and that if he could "[he] would vote to repeal it," id., such
work is meant for the legislature only, see id. The Lawrence Court was impatient with
normal democratic processes and, as such, sought to instead teach America the virtues of
liberal politics. See infra notes 209-15 and accompanying text.
19 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 584-85 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
120 See infra notes 122-173 and accompanying text. To be sure, Lawrence does not

explicitly hold that the liberty interest it found was a fundamental right, but the reader should
understand Lawrence in terms of fundamental rights.
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rights are a function of the times.'
This Note shall call this view relativistic
communitarianism.
In support of view (a), specifically relativistic communitarianism, Justice
Kennedy wrote: "we think that our laws and traditions in the past half century are
of most relevance here. [There is] an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in
matters pertaining to sex."' 22 This emerging recognition began, "and should have
been apparent when Bowers was decided,"' 123 when, in 1955, the American Law
Institute wrote in its Model Penal Code that private and consensual acts should not
be criminalized. 24 The Court in Lawrence noted that before 1961, the year Illinois
conformed to the American Law Institute's recommendation, states rarely
enforced these laws. 25 Moreover, by the time of Bowers, only half kept such laws
as part of their respective statutory compilations. 2 6 The Court concluded its
discussion of changes in American law by stating that as of the summer of 2003,
only thirteen states had sodomy laws, "of which 4 enforce their laws only against
homosexual conduct."' 27 In the states that criminalize sodomy the pattern of non28
enforcement continues. 1
Not only did the Court in Lawrence seem to invoke American relativistic
communitarianism, but it professed to apply recent changes in European law. First,
the Court cited Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 1 9 which was a 1981 European Court
of Human Rights case in which the High Court invalidated an anti-sodomy law
based on Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 30 The Court also
cited other European Court of Human Rights cases to support the notion that
Europeans had changed their attitudes towards private consensual adult sexual
conduct.' 3'
Furthermore, the Court cited an amicus brief from Amnesty
121 In fact, this is part of Professor Huhn's argument. See Wilson Huhn, The
JurisprudentialRevolution: Unlocking Human Potentialin Grutter and Lawrence, 12 WM.
& MARY BL RTs. J. 65, 68-77, 83-90 (2003). Relativistic communitarianism fails to fully
explain Lawrence. At best, the Court in Lawrence employed recent changes in American law
merely to bolster its opinion grounded in terms of natural justice. For a thorough discussion
of this, see infra notes 123-147 and accompanying text.
122 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571-72.
123 Id. at 572.
124 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2 cmt. 2 at 372 (1980), quoted in Lawrence, 539 U.S.

at 572.
125 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572.
126 Id. at 573.
127 id.
128 id.
129Id. (citing Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. 52 (ser. A) (1981)).
131 See Dudgeon, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. ( 49-51. For more on this case, see infranotes 157-60
and accompanying text.
131 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576-77 (citing Dudgeon among other cases).
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International noting that Canada, Israel, New Zealand, South Africa, Australia, and
other nations repealed their sodomy laws.'
A cursory examination of the
majority's recitation of these changes would lead a reader to think that the Court
embraced global relativistic communitarianism.
Based on the facts presently before the reader, one may draw two possible
conclusions from the foregoing analysis: (1) that the Court in Lawrence shifted away
from the Bowers-Glucksberg method of analysis or (2) that this analysis does not
necessarily mean that the Court implied a new due process standard, but that the
Court made a weak attempt to further undercut the Bowers understanding of history,
thus undercutting Bowers itself. In his dissent, Justice Scalia attacked the abovementioned points of the majority opinion as dicta because the preferred due process
test is that fundamental rights are only those that are "deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition."' 33 According to Scalia, the debate over whether one should
apply recent changes in history is irrelevant because the phrase "deeply rooted
history" only means relevant history of the 18th century founding or when the
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified." Moreover, because the test was meant to
investigate "this Nation's" history and tradition, attempts to investigate European
case law have no bearing on American due process analysis cases.
Notwithstanding Scalia' s contention that the Court's invocation of recent history
was dicta, the reader must understand that if the Court in Lawrence was willing to
embrace global relativistic communitarianism, that would further destroy the Court's
capacity to be a counter-majoritiarian institution. The reason for this is that since
at least the 1940s, the fiction that the United States Supreme Court is a countermajoritarian institution has come into question. For example, some political
scientists have argued that the Court's most politically charged opinions have in fact
followed trends in public opinion.35 If we were to accept the proposition that the
Court could deem a particular liberty interest to have fundamental rights status
solely based on the fact that a community has decided to capriciously accept the
liberty interest as fundamental, then this calls into question the institutional
legitimacy of the Supreme Court.
Furthermore, in spite of issues of institutional legitimacy, Justice Scalia
correctly argued that if the Court in Lawrence embraced relativistic communitarian-

32

Id.; see also Brief Amici Curiae of Mary Robinson et al. at 11-15, Lawrence (No.

02-102); Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576-77. But see id. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ('"The
Court's discussion of these foreign views (ignoring, of course, the many countries that have
retained criminal prohibitions on sodomy) is... dicta.").
"' Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
134 Id.
" E.g., William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan. The Supreme Court as a
CountermajoritarianInstitution?The Impact ofPublic Opinionon Supreme CourtDecisions,
87 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 87, 96-97 (1993).
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ism, such an embrace would logically threaten abortion rights.'36 He stated, inter
alia, that the Court may have invalidated prior precedent if "[the precedent] has been
subject to 'substantial and continuing' criticism."' 37 Just as Bowers was subject to
criticism in the last two decades, "Roe too (and by extension Casey) ha[s] been (and
still is) subject to unrelenting criticism."' 131 One may argue that if the Court
articulated a relativistic communitarian standard for fundamental rights in Lawrence,
such a standard could theoretically work to constrict rights just as much as it could
expand rights based on the passions and whims of the community."
As much as Scalia's critical points have a sound basis, one need not fret over
them, for the Court in Lawrence did not announce a global relativistic
communitarian standard."4 In the next section, this Note argues that the foundation
for the Court's opinion is its conception of natural justice. Because the Court is
primarily concerned with maintaining the dignity and autonomy of free-willed
individuals, such an idea is inconsistent with the notion of the Court announcing a
relativistic communitarian standard.'14 With that in mind, the reader should under
36 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586-89
13 Id. at 587 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
138 Id. at 589 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

(Scalia, J., dissenting).

9 The Court in Lawrence was somewhat aware of this and is why it distinguished the
Bowers-Lawrencesaga from the abortion rights saga. The Court reasoned that although Roe
was subject to criticism, Roe, unlike Bowers, induced reliance on the part of many women
such that they knew they had the freedom to choose. Id. at 577. The Court in Lawrence
argued that no one really relied on the holding of Bowers. id. But see id. at 589 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (countering the majority's claim that Bowers induced no reliance by showing that
many states and the federal government have relied on Bowers to enforce morals legislation).
"~ One argument is that Lawrence changed the substantive due process doctrine to apply
a global relativistic communitarian standard. See Huhn, supra note 121, at 83-90. A recent
Eleventh Circuit dissent echoes this sentiment. See Lofton v. Sec'y of Dep't of Children &
Family Servs., 377 F.3d 1275 (1 lth Cir. 2004) (Barkett, J. dissenting) (arguing that Lawrence
reaffirmed a fundamental right to privacy based in part on recent history and tradition).
Whereas Lawrence seems to employ relativistic communitarianism, this Note argues that
classical liberal political ideals controlled Lawrence.
"4' If Lawrence had announced a relativistic communitarian standard, it would have
endorsed a theory of constitutional interpretation that defers to true democratic impulses, for
a relativistic communitarian standard would ground fundamental rights according to whether
the community felt that they were fundamental. These majoritarian impulses may clash with
the notion of protecting individual rights, such as the right to privacy. Commenting on the
problems with direct democracy, Madison wrote that in a direct democracy, "[t]he passions,
therefore, not the reason, of the public would sit in judgment." THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at
317 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Of course, "[k]nowledge makes men
gentle; [and only] reason leads to humanity." MoNTESQUIEU, The Spirit of the Laws, in
SELECTED PoLrrIcAL WRINGs 203 (Melvin Richter trans., Hackett Pub. Co. 1990) (1748).
Working back from this premise, if we presume that the Court in Lawrence intended humane
ends, then it must have endorsed a theory that has in mind reason and not passions. Direct
democratic impulses are irrational and contradict the dispassionate tenets of classical
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stand all of the historical references in Lawrence as a shallow endeavor to attack
the reasoning in Bowers. Even if one were to delete the description of history in
Lawrence, the opinion would still have merit as a piece of classical liberal philosophy.
E. How the Lawrence Court Extended the FundamentalRight of Privacy and
Association " la Means of NaturalJustice
This Section argues that readers should understand Lawrence as an implicit in
ordered liberty case that granted the fundamental right of privacy without ever using
the terms "implicit in ordered liberty," "natural justice," or "fundamental right."' 4
Three elements illustrate this point: (a) language in the majority opinion that proves
the Court did not mean to rely solely on the community as a foundation for rights;
(b) application of precedent where that precedent itself has its origins in classical
liberal natural justice; and (c) elements of liberal political philosophy found within
the opinion itself.
1. Whither Community?
To begin, Justice Kennedy quotes his own concurring opinion from County of
Sacramento v. Lewis'43 in Lawrence: "History and tradition are the starting point but
not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due process inquiry."'" Although
Kennedy's quote from Lewis was referring to the need to look at government
interests, 45 it has salience nonetheless as a starting point for this subsection's
argument that Lawrence did not primarily rely on history and tradition. More on
point is Justice Stevens's Bowers dissent that the Court in Lawrence: "The fact that
the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as
immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice;
neither history nor tradition could save a law prohibiting miscegenation from
constitutionalattack.'"' 46 The Court in Lawrence thus implied that at times history
liberalism, thus the Court could not have embraced a relativistic communitarian standard that
invokes true democratic principles.
142 See supra Part L.A (describing how the Court has deemed a liberty interest to be
fundamental and hence deserving of the strictest scrutiny only if it is implicit in ordered
liberty or grounded in natural law).
143523 U.S. 833 (1998).
'4 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572 (quoting Lewis, 523 U.S. at 857 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
4' The quote continues: "There is room as well for an objective assessment of the
necessities of law enforcement, in which the police must be given substantial latitude and
discretion, acknowledging, of course, the primacy of the interest in life which the State, by
the Fourteenth Amendment, is bound to respect." Id. at 857-58.
146 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577-78 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186,216 (1986)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added)). See generally infra notes 199-205 and
accompanying text (criticizing the pitfalls of the history and tradition approach).
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and tradition could lead to unjust results, which is certainly true in Lawrence and
Garner's case, and therefore, the Court needed to invoke a more natural justice
oriented theory to overrule Bowers. Certainly, courts should not sustain laws merely
4
'7
because they were "laid down in the time of Henry IV.'
2. Reliance on Precedent: Indirect Application of Liberal Theory
Not only did Lawrence counsel against applying the community's will for its
own sake, but the Court also referred to cases steeped in classical liberal thought.
48
The Court commenced this process by initially citing Pierce v. Society of Sisters
and Meyer v. Nebraska,"'9 but it reasoned that "the most pertinent beginning point
[was its] decision in Griswold v. Connecticut.""' This Note has observed that
Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Griswoldwas grounded in natural justice.15'
The Court also availed itself of its opinion in Roe v. Wade.'52 Commenting on the
correctness of the decision in Roe, the Court in Lawrence wrote that the case
"recognized the right of a woman to make certain fundamental decisions affecting
her destiny and confirmed once more that the protection of liberty under the Due
Process Clause has a substantive dimension of fundamental significance in defining
the rights of the person."'53 This statement supporting free will is a liberal
sentiment, 1" and one that readers can analogize to a statement supporting the free
will of a homosexual to make fundamental decisions controlling his or her destiny,
155
such as the right to be intimate with another individual of the same sex.
Furthermore, albeit meant to undercut the reasoning of Bowers, the Court's
invocation of Dudgeon v. United Kingdom'5 6 indirectly supports the idea that
Lawrence is a natural justice case. As previously mentioned,' 57 that case invalidated
"' Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 469 (1897).
4' 268 U.S. 510 (1925). The Court in Pierce made a claim to justice that "[tihe
fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any
general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction
from public teachers only." Id. at 535.
149262

U.S. 390 (1923).

Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564 (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)).
'51 For more on this and how the Court made other "broader statements"
of liberty, see
supra Part I.A.1.
'

152

410 U.S. 113 (1973).

1 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 565.
'54 See, e.g., HOBBES, supra note 49, ch. xiv, at para. 1 ("THE RIGHT OF NATURE. . . jUS
naturale, is the liberty each man hath to use his own power, as he will himself... and
consequently of doing anything which, in his own judgment and reason, he shall conceive
to be the aptest means thereunto.").
t See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578-79.
156 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) (1981).
'57 See supra notes 130-32 and accompanying text.
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a European anti-sodomy law. In the process of doing so, Dudgeon cited liberal
expressions:
The right to respect for private life is of such a scope as to
secure to the individual a sphere within which he can freely
pursue the development and fulfillment of his personality. To
this effect, he must also have the possibility of establishing
relationships of various kinds, including sexual, with other
persons.... [W]henever the State sets up rules for the behaviour
of the individual within this sphere, it interferes with the respect
158
for private life .
Thus, Lawrence appealed to a case stressing liberal natural justice to support its
larger conclusion that "[t]he liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual
persons the right to make [the] choice [to choose to form intimate bonds in their
private lives]."" 9 Whereas Lawrence recited precedent steeped in liberal theory, the
strongest argument for the suggestion that classical liberal natural justice best
explains Lawrence is that the language in Lawrence itself echoes classical liberal
political theory.
3. Lawrence as Classical Liberal Political Philosophy
The portions of the Lawrence opinion that this Note calls philosophical in nature
are found at the beginning and end of the majority's opinion.' 6 These portions lack
citations to precedent or authority, indicating that they provide the best insight into
how the majority (especially Justice Kennedy) thought about this issue. 61 Although
62
the Court never used the term "natural justice," the comparisons are plentiful.
Likewise, even though the Court never wrote that Lawrence and Garner's rights
were "implicit in ordered liberty," the beginning of the opinion spoke broadly to the
nature of liberty.
In the third sentence of the opinion, the Court proclaimed that "there are other
spheres of our lives and existence, outside the home, where the State should not be
a dominant presence."' 6 3 This normative statement reflects a general sentiment
against the omnipresent state; liberal philosophers argue that it is imperative that a

118 Dudgeon v.

United Kingdom, 3 Eur. H.R. Rep. 40,51 (1980) (quoting Briiggemann &
Scheuten v. Federal Republic of Germany, 10 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 100 (1978)).
159Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
'60 See id. at 562, 578-79.
161 See id.
162 See infra notes 164-74 and accompanying text.
163 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562 (emphasis added).
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liberal government have limited ends. 64 The Court continued, defining the concept
of liberty in terms consistent with classical liberalism: "Liberty presumes an
autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain
intimate conduct."' 65 The Court thus reasoned that within the ideal of protecting the
individual from the omnipresent state is the promise that certain intimate conduct
is also exempt from state interference.
Consistent with the classical liberal notion that freedom has spatial
boundaries,"6 the Court cautioned that its extension of an intimate privacy right did
not give pure sexual license:
The present case does not involve minors. It does not
involve persons who might be injured or coerced or who are
situated in relationships where consent might not easily be
refused. . . . [It] does involve two adults who, with full and
mutual consent from each other, engaged in sexual practices
common to a homosexual lifestyle.' 67
The Court then spoke to the proper ends of the arms of government. Much like how
classical liberalism is cautious to infringe on the personal autonomy of individuals
" For example, Locke teaches that the "natural liberty of man is to be free from any
superior power on earth...." LOCKE, supra note 3, § 17. Combining that precept with the
concept that human beings only collectively participate in organized civil society for the
"mutual preservation of their lives, liberties and estates," then one must understand the
liberal state as one that maximizes personal freedom while only limiting that freedom for the
narrowest of ends. Id. § 123; cf.Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) (limiting the
power of the sovereign to act when an act would violate classical liberal precepts). See
generally HOBBES, supra note 49, ch. xxi, at para. 18 ("In cases where the sovereign has
prescribed no rule, there the subject hath the liberty to do or forbear ... ").
65 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562. For a liberal statement of respect for liberty of thought,
tolerance, and protection of minority rights thereof, see JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 18
(David Spitz ed., W.W. Norton & Co. 1975) (1859) ("Ifall mankind minus one were of one
opinion... mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person, than he...
would be justified in silencing mankind.").
"6 See generallyHOBBES, supra note 49, chs. xxi, at paras. 11-12, xlii, at paras. 126-27
(implying that when one subject invades the physical liberty of another subject, the attacker
has broken the social contract between subjects and returned them to a state of nature, and
thus the victim may exercise his right of self-defense found within the state of nature).
167 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. The reader should not confuse this cautionary expression
with that found within Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 499 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring), in which the Justice reminded
Griswold's readers about the narrow scope of the majority's opinion. See id.at 498-99 ("[lIt
should be said of the Court's holding today that it in no way interferes with a State's proper
regulation of sexual promiscuity or misconduct."). That cautionary expression was more
concerned with community mores vis-A-vis liberal thought.
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(for the liberal regime is supposed to have limited ends such as peace, security, and
respect for autonomy), 6 1 the Court in Lawrence wrote that "[the] Texas Statute
furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal
69
andprivate life of the individual."'

7
Next, the Court understood that its opinion would generate political backlash. '
Nevertheless, whereas it is true that for liberals truths are self-evident, the Court
applied a theory of rights that holds true certain constants, yet makes them fluid to
the times. "[P]ersons in every generation can invoke [Constitutional] principles in
their own search for greater freedom."'' One could interpret this statement as
embracing a relativistic communitarian standard but, on the other hand, this
statement does not tell the reader that the community merely defines what liberty
interests are fundamental rights. More correctly, this statement signifies that there
are certain truths dictated by natural justice that the political community can come
to realize apply to a particular set of facts. The truth itself remains constant.
Although insightful, the historical analysis in Lawrence comes second to its
philosophical teachings. The beginning and end of the opinion illustrate how
Lawrence must be understood as an implicit in ordered liberty case and that the
strong language the Court used to characterize the importance of Lawrence and
Garner's liberty interest commands that one sees this interest as a fundamental right,
notwithstanding the fact that the case appears to turn on a lack of legitimate state

interest.'72 Working from the presumption that Lawrence is a natural justice funda-

mental rights case, Part III explores (a) whether the federal courts will revisit implicit
in ordered liberty analysis and (b) whether the observation that Lawrence overruled
Bowers not only in terms of holding, but also in terms of proper due process
reasoning makes a significant difference in substantive due process jurisprudence.
III. NOT

So LANDMARK AFTER ALL? LAWRENCE AS AN ISOLATED YET
PHILOSOPHICALLY DEFENSIBLE CASE

Presuming that Part II of this Note is correct in claiming that a classical liberal
conception of justice dictated the outcome in Lawrence, this Note must now address
See KAuTz, supra note 13, at 22-37.
U.S. at 578 (emphasis added). On its face, this language suggests that
the Court was using a heightened rational basis review to invalidate the Statute. Although
one is correct to think that the Court was attacking the purported state interest, presumably
morality, the language invoked by the Court suggests that the Court meant not only to chastise
the purported state interest, but also to elevate Lawrence and Gamer's liberty interest.
in
17 This may be why the Court never used the terms "fundamental right" or "implicit
holding
its
limited
ordered liberty." A fear of political backlash may also be why the Court
to the facts of the case so that the "government [did not have to] give formal recognition to
any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter." Id.
171 Id. at 579.
72 See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
168

169 Lawrence, 539

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 13:617

two consequences of that assessment. First, when the Supreme Court alters precedent, the obvious question to ask is: how will that alteration be binding on lower
courts? An initial reaction from the reader should be that if the Court in Lawrence
approached a due process case in a different manner than it had in previous years,
then a logical conclusion is that lower courts would observe the Supreme Court's
behavior and follow suit. Such is not the case post-Lawrence. In fact, an investigation of recent circuit court opinions indicate that lower courts will not divert from
the Bowers-Glucksberg line of cases any time soon.'73
Second, this Part recognizes a more abstract philosophical criticism of Lawrence
that follows from the foregoing Part. This criticism claims that implicit in ordered
liberty opinions, which Justices really mean to base in terms of Nature and Reason,
are more reflective of a Justice's subjective bias vis-A-vis objective and positive
truth. By both circumventing normal democratic processes and imposing a bias
couched in terms of objectivity, the Court in Lawrence was Nietzschean in the sense
that it imposed its will-to-power on the nation. However, as this Note argues, it is
a fallacy to presuppose that because a case like Bowers purported to apply a correct
view of deeply rooted American history and tradition, that it was therefore any
more objective than Lawrence. This Note explains both Bowers and Lawrence in
Nietzschean terms.' 74 To claim that Bowers was any more correct than Lawrence
because the Supreme Court invoked an objective view of history is naive. Lawrence
is thus an inconsequential case in terms of due process jurisprudence because it
will not seriously affect the decision-making models and because all due process
opinions, whether they are history and tradition or implicit in ordered liberty
opinions, illustrate a Justice's will-to-power.
A. Substantive Due ProcessPost-Lawrence

Although this Note argues that Lawrence was an implicit in ordered liberty case,
subsequent substantive due process cases still adhere to the Bowers-Glucksberg
model, i.e., long-standing history and tradition. For example, Galdikas v. Fagan'75
decided a controversy in which graduate students of a medical school appealed a
denial of a § 1983 claim that their constitutional rights were violated when the
public school discontinued their program. 76
' Specifically, they claimed, inter alia,
that they had a "fundamental right to a continuing education. '7 The Seventh Circuit
denied the substantive due process aspect of their claim based on Glucksberg. That
171See infra Part

III.A.
" That is, in the sense that the Bowers Court imposed its own will-to-power on the
nation. See Part III.C.
175342 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 686.
17 Id. at 688.
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court held that deeply rooted history and tradition did not support an affirmative
duty on the part of public institutions to provide continuing education.' 78 The court
did not, however, state that natural justice does or does not support the right, which
would have been more akin to the Lawrence-like line of cases.
Likewise, in Bell v. Ohio State University,179 the Sixth Circuit reviewed a case
where the plaintiff challenged that Ohio State University denied her, among other
things, substantive due process by making her repeat certain medical school classes
and examinations. 8 ° The gist of her due process claim was that such action was
arbitrary and discriminatory in nature.'' She claimed she had a "[fundamental]
liberty interest in continued enrollment in the Medical College."' 82 The Sixth
Circuit disagreed. Invoking Glucksberg, the court stated, "[o]ur Nation's history,
legal tradition, and practices thus provide the crucial guideposts for responsible
decision making, that direct and restrain our exposition of the Due Process
Clause."' 83 The appellate court asserted that no such right existed for the plaintiff.'
Again, as in Fagan, this court did not use natural justice analysis.
The reason neither court applied natural justice analysis is rather straightforward. Nowhere in Lawrence did the Court expressly state that Lawrence and
Garner's privacy right was implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. Although
Lawrence really applied a natural justice method of analysis, non-legal factors, such
as fear of seeming too activist, likely played a role in the Lawrence Court's odd
opinion. 5 Admittedly, this is a hypothesis that would require investigation in
another paper. For the purposes of this Note, it is enough to conclude that although
Lawrence was a natural justice case, the fact that the Supreme Court purposely
omitted the phrase "implicit in ordered liberty" means that lower courts are left with
86
no choice but to apply Glucksberg as the binding fundamental rights precedent.
As Part HI of this Note illustrated, the Lawrence opinion was a poorly written
opinion by Supreme Court standards.' 87 The opinion is landmark in terms of
applying the right of privacy to a new class of activity, but it is far from being a
88
landmark opinion in terms of changing future fundamental rights jurisprudence.'
171
179
18

id. at 688-89.
351 F.3d 240 (6th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 244-46, 249.

181

Id. at 249.

182

Id.

'8' Id. at 250.

Id. at 251.
See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562-79 (neglecting to mention the phrase "implicit in
ordered liberty" in the majority opinion).
186 See id.
117 See id. at 593-94 n.3 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (pointing out that the majority never used
the phrase "history and tradition," let alone the phrase "implicit in ordered liberty").
188 See supra notes 176-85 and accompanying text.
'8

185
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B. The Apparent CosmopolitanCriticism of Lawrence

A critic of Lawrence may attack the case for that which gives it virtue: the fact
that it turns on a conception of justice more so than an interpretation of history.
Such a criticism insists that only an application of history and tradition, rather than
a conception of justice, can prevent the Court from usurping the role of lawmaker
vis-A-vis law interpreter." 9 Arguing against a method of analysis that primarily
applies justice over relativistic communitarianism, Justice White best articulated
this sentiment:
Nor are we inclined to take a more expansive view of our
authority to discover new fundamental rights imbedded in the
Due Process Clause. The Court is most vulnerable and comes
nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language
or design of the Constitution. 0
Similarly, Robert Bork feared that judicial activism would lead to a situation where
"[a] judge has begun to rule where a legislator should."' 9 ' Conservative critics of
Lawrence may undoubtedly argue that the opinion's reliance on natural justice
illustrates the judiciary's tendency to impose its will on the American people. 92
These critics defend Bowers as being less of an example ofjudicial activism 'a la the
application of an elite body's view of justice, and more of the objective application
of historical truth. For the defenders of Bowers and relativistic communitarianism,
the history and tradition test is a tool to enhance the separation of powers between
the prescriptive and adjudicative branches of the federal government. The reality
is that both Bowers and Lawrence are more similar than some scholars would think.
C. Viewing Lawrence and Bowers through a Nietzschean Lens

In essence, the argument against using an implicit in ordered liberty/natural
justice analysis is that Justices who employ such tactics are fooling themselves if
they think their means are objective. Unlike the subjective jurists, the judge who
honestly examines history and tradition is more objective. At least, the judge views
See Bowers, 478 U.S. 186; see also infra note 192 and accompanying text.
"9Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194.

'89

191ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLrTICAL SEDUCTION OF THE

LAW 1 (1990).
192 This insight is more of a prediction than an actual fact as of the writing of this Note.
Notwithstanding that fact, the aforementioned predicative criticism is a reasonable one.
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him or herself as one who may not "override democratic majorities when the
Constitution is silent [on whether an explicit fundamental right exists]."' 93 When
Justice White wrote that "[tihe Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to
illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no
cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution,"' 94 he implied that
somehow a historical analysis of American constitutional history, by limiting
judicial activism, was truer to a textual approach to Constitutional interpretation
and hence more objective.195 One may attack this purported view of objective
judicial restraint on two grounds: first, that this view is not as objective as one may
think; second, that this view wrongly becomes an apology for a litany of injustices
in American history.
With respect to problems of objectivity, an application of Nietzschean philosophy teaches that the history and tradition approach to substantive due process is
just as subjective as the implicit in ordered liberty approach. Nietzsche criticized
those who claimed that their reasoned deductions were objective:
They all pose as if they had discovered and reached their real
opinions through the self-development of a cold, pure, divinely
unconcerned dialectic ... while at bottom it is an assumption, a

hunch, indeed a kind of "inspiration" - most often a desire of
the heart that has been filtered and made abstract - that they
defend with reasons they have sought after the fact."9
Although Nietzsche was generally speaking to deontologists like Immanuel Kant,
this argument has applicability to both proponents of a natural justice based view of
fundamental rights and proponents of a history and tradition model. According to
Nietzsche, the natural law philosopher has a particular end and the philosophy he or
she relies upon is a means to that end. The basis for that end, however, is not
"divinely unconcerned," i.e., disinterested, for no rational thought is objective
according to Nietzsche. In fact, the philosophical system is an artifice. The philosopher merely seeks to "discharge[his] strength... [and] will to power"'97 through
alleged objective truths.
If the natural law philosophical system is an artifice, then according to
Nietzsche, proponents of the history and tradition approach seem to have an advan193BORK, supra note

192, at 240.
478 U.S. at 194.
195See id. at 195 ("There should be, therefore, great resistance to expand the substantive
reach of those Clauses, particularly if it requires redefining the category of rights deemed to
'94 Bowers,

be fundamental.").
196 FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, BEYOND GOOD & EvIL: PRELUDE TO A PHILOSOPHY OF THE
FuTuRE 12 (Walter Kaufmann trans., Vintage Books ed. 1989) (1886).
19' Id.

at 21.
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tage against proponents of the natural justice approach to fundamental rights.
However, this position is simply not correct. An analysis of deeply rooted American
history and tradition does not "confine[] judges to any particular range of results."' 8
To wit: "people have come to understand that 'tradition' can be invoked in support
of almost any cause. There is obvious room to maneuver, along continua of both
space and time, on the subject of which tradition to invoke."' 99 In fact, much like
the natural law philosopher, the historian-jurist has a certain subjective end and
tailors an interpretation of history to that end - he too imposes his will-to-power
on the readers of his opinions." 0 Justice White's use of history to strike down the
right to engage in sodomy in Bowers was as subjective as Justice Kennedy's libertybased promotion of autonomy in Lawrence. The history and tradition method of
substantive due process analysis is subjective.
Not only is that method subjective, it is apologetic for unjust periods in
American history. Notwithstanding the fact that Nietzsche would argue that there
is no such thing as "injustice" in the objective sense, but only what an individual or
group thinks is unjust,2"' to argue that deeply rooted history and tradition should be
society's guiding beacon for fundamental rights leads one to find that history and
tradition may not be supportive of rights. "[N]ot all traditions are admirable. 2 °2

For example, "the history of straight, white, wealthy males is often a history of the
oppressor. As such, relying on tradition frequently legitimizes and perpetuates prior
discrimination... [which] is at odds with the letter and spirit of the Fourteenth
Amendment."2 3 Of course, Nietzsche would claim that this statement is not
necessarily an objective view, for the writer obviously had a biased intent when
examining history. Nevertheless, the point of the statement is to rebut those who
claim that history and tradition are good tools for finding unenumerated
fundamental rights.'$
198

BORK, supra note 192, at 235.

'" John Hart Ely, Foreword:On Discovering FundamentalValues, 92 HARV. L. REv. 5,
39 (1978).
200 See Adam B. Wolf, FundamentallyFlawed: Traditionand FundamentalRights, 57 U.
M"AMI L. REv. 101, 154 (2002) ("[E]mploying tradition to assess a purported fundamental
right does not lend to the jurisprudence the certainty or objectivity it is supposed to
provide.").
201 See NIETzscHE, supra note 197.
202 BORK, supra note 192, at 235. See generally MILL, supra note 166, at 66 ("The
despotism of custom is everywhere the standing hindrance to... the spirit of liberty .....
203 Wolf, supra note 201, at 154.
204 Not only is "history and tradition" a poor tool for finding unenumerated fundamental
rights, an examination of only recent history and tradition, i.e., the relativistic communitarian
standard, is akin to supporting direct democracy, because the historian-jurist only looks at
the whims of the majority generation in power by researching current trends in legislation.
"[T]radition is majoritarian... [because it is] deferential to legislative choices." Gregory C.
Cook, Note, Footnote 6: Justice Scalia'sAttempt to Impose a Rule of Law on Substantive
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Whereas Lawrence does represent a shift from the more communitarian trend
in fundamental rights analysis, the shift is not drastic. Lower courts that have decided
substantive due process claims have ignored them in the months following the
decision. This makes sense, for the Court in Lawrence never explicitly announced
a change in doctrine. Besides not having an effect on stare decisis in terms of due
process decision making, the differences between the Bowers line of cases and the
Lawrence line of cases are not that great. In this sense, all forms of reasoning are
based on the prejudices of the philosopher. Nevertheless, future courts should apply
the type of analysis in Lawrence, i.e., the natural justice approach, in future cases.
1. Why Natural Justice?
Whereas the Court in Lawrence was right to utilize a substantive due process
model grounded in natural justice, the Court stopped short of drafting the most
desirable opinion. The correct understanding of Lawrence is to read the majority's
opinion as a piece of liberal political philosophy with legal ramifications. The Court
in Lawrence lacked the will to explicitly state this, for it never used the terms
"implicit in ordered liberty," much less the phrases "natural justice" or "classical
liberalism." The question remains: in the future, should the Court craft opinions in
terms of natural justice or classical liberal philosophy?
A substantive due process system that avails itself of natural law through means
of the implicit in ordered liberty test compares a statement claiming that a liberty
interest is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty with the statement that nature
2 5
When a
dictates that the law deems the liberty interest to be fundamental.
fundamental rights claim presents itself before the Court, a Justice would reason
whether that claim is essential to a classical understanding of the role of liberty in
civil society vis-A-vis looking towards the history and tradition of the polity for
support. This approach is more consistent with the Founding Fathers' view of due
process. "[Ijt is clear that the Founders believed in unwritten natural rights... [that]
deserved judicial protection even if they were not contained in the Constitution's
text . . . Therefore, higher law, or natural law, is 'arguably the great founding
principle of American constitutionalism.'"26 Natural justice principles, especially
2 7
the teachings of Locke and Montesquieu, influenced the Founding Fathers.
Due Process, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 853, 869 n.85 (1991). For a classical liberal
analysis of this problem, see supra note 141 and accompanying text.
205 See supra Part I.A.
206 Christopher J. Schmidt, Revitalizing the Quiet Ninth Amendment: Determining
Unenumerated Rights andEliminating Substantive Due Process,32 U. BALT. L. REv. 169,
207-08 (2003) (quoting David N. Mayer, The NaturalRights Basis ofthe NinthAmendment:
A Reply to ProfessorMcAffee, 16 S. ILL. U. L.J. 313,326 (1992)); see also supra note 3 and
accompanying text (establishing the link between Lockean and Jeffersonian classical liberal
philosophy and the Due Process Clauses).
207 See Schmidt, supra note 207, at 207-12. The Anti-Federalists embraced precepts of
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Not only is the natural justice approach more consistent with an originialist
interpretation of the Constitution, but natural justice principles serve as better gap
fillers for constitutional interpretation when one compares the principles to fluid
history. On one hand, to argue in favor of natural justice principles may be an
exercise in will-to-power, according to Nietzsche.0 8 On the other hand, to argue as
such is not exactly to make the law up:
Rather, [the Constitution is] an open ended and complex
document [that] is read in a certain spirit: in light of the
principles that seem to underlie its specific phrases and larger
structures, principles that help justify the document's more
specific aspects. Indeed, by interpreting the document in light
of its underlying moral principles we extend the document's
meaning in a way that vindicates the preamble's claim that the
Constitution is meant to approximate justice and other basic
moral goals....
...[Furthermore,] [s]upplementing the text with natural law
theory it was premised upon ... further explains the law ..... 09

Under this desirable view, a judge is wise to invoke classical liberal theory to
shape the arguments surrounding an unenumerated rights claim. Although "[tihe
ideas of natural justice are regulated by no fixed standard, 210 neither is the Justice's
choice of history."' If both principles are equally vague and open to bias, the judge
ought to use natural justice analysis in supplementing silent portions of the
Constitution, because principles of natural justice are more in tune with the goals of
the liberal community that the Founding Fathers wished to ensure.212

natural law as well. "[I]n forming a government on its true principles, the foundation should
be laid... by expressly reserving to the people such of their essential naturalrights ....
"Brutus," To the Citizens of the State of New York, N.Y. J., Nov. 1, 1787, reprintedin 2THE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 373 (Herbert J.Storing ed., 1981) (emphasis added). I mean
not to offer a defense of originalism in this Note, but only to suggest that the backers of
originalism could understand classical liberal thought as consistent with originalism.
208 See NIETZSCHE, supra note 197 (haranguing philosophers for claiming that their
philosophies are objective).
209 Schmidt, supra note 207, at 209, 213 (quoting STEPHEN MACEDO, THE NEW RIGHT V.
THE CONsTrrU-ON 40 (1986)).

Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 399 (1796) (Iredell, J., concurring).
See Ely, supra note 200 and accompanying text.
212 Among the goals of the classical liberal polity are peace, security, tolerance,
moderation, and humanity. See KAUTz, supra note 13, at 23-77, 171-91.
210
211
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Critics of this proposal would argue not only that this view is arrogant,2 13 but

also that it leads to the judiciary's further usurpation of Congress's legislative
role.21 4 Proponents can claim that the history and tradition approach is more
democratic, but the natural justice approach has the advantage to teach readers of
Supreme Court opinions (however few there are!) the virtues of classical liberalism
properly understood. Classical liberalism provides the strongest basis for substantive
due process jurisprudence.
CONCLUSION

Echoing classical liberal thought, the Fourteenth Amendment provides, "[n]o
State shall.., deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law. ' '21 5 Applying the Fourteenth Amendment, substantive due process jurisprudence teaches that states may not infringe upon unenumerated liberties that are
either "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" or "deeply rooted in American
history and tradition. 21 6 Before Lawrence, the Rehnquist Court applied heightened
review only to those fundamental rights that were "deeply rooted in American
history and tradition. 2 7 If the Court in Lawrence meant to bind itself to stare
decisis, it could not have granted Lawrence and Garner a desirable result. Whereas
the Court did alter fundamental rights precedent, it did not merely change the
Bowers-Glucksberg model, 2" but in fact returned to a classical liberal-inspired
implicit in ordered liberty analysis.21 9

Working from the conclusion that lawyers must understand Lawrence as an
opinion steeped in classical liberal thought, this Note recalls that some scholars
would take issue with the Court for the reason that classical liberal-inspired opinions
are a function of judicial activism. 220 This Note counters by arguing that such a
view is misguided on many accounts. First, Lawrence never actually used the
phrases "implicit in ordered liberty" or "fundamental right. '22' The reader just
needs to recognize Lawrence as a fundamental rights opinion.222 Even so, lower
213

See Ely, supra note 200, at 38 (noting that some scholars view the natural justice

approach as "flagrantly elitist and undemocratic").
214 See, e.g., Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194 (1986) (fearing that the "implicit in ordered liberty"
approach to fundamental rights exacerbates the problem of judicial activism).
215 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
216 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
217 See supra Part II.B.2.
218 See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
29 See supra notes 124-48 and accompanying text.
120 See, e.g., Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194; see also supra notes 190-94 and accompanying
text.

221 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 593-94 & n.3 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
222 See supra notes 90-172 and accompanying text (arguing that Lawrence is a

fundamental rights case).

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 13:617

circuit courts continue to take their cue from the Bowers-Glucksberg line of
communitarian cases.223

Notwithstanding these points on precedent, the defenders of the communitarian
history and tradition approach could benefit from reading Nietzsche before
criticizing Lawrence as an exacerbation of judicial activism. Nietzsche teaches that
all claims to justice and all interpretations of history illustrate the philosopher's will
to impose his or her beliefs on others.2 4 Nietzschean postmodern thought thus
instructs that both the implicit in ordered liberty approach and the history and
tradition method reflect a court's prejudice. Lawrence will not worsen the perceived
threat of judicial activism, and the decision was not any less objective than Bowers.
Because Lawrence and Bowers suffered from an identical subjectivism, and because
Lawrence does not seriously change due process precedent on a thematic scale,225
Lawrence is indeed not so landmark after all.
The connection of Lawrence to classical liberal political philosophy gives the
case virtue, however. This Note reminds its readers that classical liberalism and
natural justice are of vital use in substantive due process jurisprudence. This Note's
rationale for classical liberalism is notjust a theoretical argument, but also a sensible
one. Classical liberalism was the ideological underpinning for the aspirations of the
Constitution,226 and for that reason, the Supreme Court ought to invoke its principles
when investigating whether a fundamental right exists.

See supra notes
See supra notes
225 See supra notes
226 See supra notes
223

224

accompanying text.

176-85 and accompanying text.
192-212 and accompanying text.
176-89 and accompanying text.
3-4, 12, 28-31, 43, 48, 142, 155, 165-67, 208-09, 214, 218 and

